Model Of Publıc Choıce And Polıtıcal Rent

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Agnieszka Bezat Jarzębowska
Włodzimierz Rembisz
Agata Sielska


It can be assumed that  the scop e of agricultural policy  and connected with it  financial streams are not accidental. Selection of a particular policy defines a mechanism in which the benefits and costs are combined. Such an effort of describing and explaining the mechanism was presented in the paper. It is necessary to see not only the income effects of agricultural policy, but  also the cost of their induction. Of course, such a mechanism of policy choice has a theoretical background in a sense that it allows bringing out the essence of the actual process of creating the policy. We use the concept of public choice model.

Issues of including political (or administrative) interest in defining and shaping the policy are incorporated  in the models  of public choice. Based on M ueller, the public choice can be described as “economic research of non-market decisions making” or just “use of economics in political science”. The authors assumed the rationality of decision makers and their goal to maximize their own utility [M ueller  1989]. This  approach is  often  used to analyze agriculture and changes  occurring within this  area.  The analysis presented in the paper are some reference to one of the trends of political economy, according to which the emphasis is on the voters’ behavior [see M artin 1990, p. 189-211, Patterson 1997, p. 135-165; Elliott and Heath 2000, p 42-48].


Keywords: public choice, political rent, agricultural policy, political-economic analysis


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